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CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION-How RAISED TO CONFER JURISDICTION
ON SUPREME COURT. Donoho v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.l-Section
12, Article VI of the Constitution of Missouri provides, among other
things, that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction "in
cases involving the construction of the Constitution of the United
States or of this State." This language is general, and, as there Is no
statute declaring how such questions must be raised in the trial court
so as to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, much litigation
has gone to the appellate courts Involving this point of practice.
The Supreme Court has ruled that it will not take Jurisdiction on
the ground that a constitutional question is involved unless the record
of the case in the trial court affirmatively shows that the protection
of the Constitution was expressly invoked by one of the parties in some
method recognized in pleading and practice, that it was decided ad-
versely to the party appealing, and that he saved his exceptions to the
adverse ruling of the court.2 The question is not properly presented
to the Supreme Court unless it Is imbedded In the record of the trial
*Absent on leave 1916-17. During Professor Hudson's absence the Law
Series will be in charge of Dean James.
1. (Mo., 1916) 184 S. W. 1149.
2. Bennett v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1891) 105 Mo. 642, 16 S. W. 947,
See Turley v. Bates (1895) 131 Mo. 548, 33 S.W. 172; Parlin d Orendorff Co.
v. Hord (1898) 145 Mo. 117, 46 S. W. 753; Ash v. City of Independende
(1898) 145 Mo. 120, 46 S. W. 749; State v. Rayniontd (1900) 156 Mo. 117,
56 S. W. 894; Coleman v. Cole (1900) 162 Mo. 516, 63 S. W. 89; Hardan
v. City of Carthage (1902) 171 Mo. 442, 71 S. W. 673; Broum v. M. K. & T.
Ry. (1903) 175 Mo. 185, 74 S. W. 973 ; State ex rel. v. Smith (1903) 176 Mo.
44, 75 S. W. 468; City of Tarkio v. Loyd (1903) 179 Mo. 600, 78 S. W. 797;(32)
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below.3 The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court does not depend upon
the validity of the constitutional question, that is whether a constitu-
tional right has actually been violated; it is enough if a clear and sub-
stantial claim is involved.4 But if only a sham question is raised,
for example, if appellant in the court below has invoked the protection
of the Constitution merely to have the Supreme Court instead of the
court of appeals try his appeal, the Supreme Court will transfer the
case to the court of appeals. The Supreme Court will consider it a
sham question if appellant in his brief merely mentions the constitu-
tional question without specification or argument.5
The constitutional question generally must be raised during the
trial at the earliest possible moment that good pleading and orderly
procedure will admit. Otherwise it will be waived.s Where possible,
it should be raised in the pleadings. The case of Dudley v. Wabash
R. R. Co.,7 goes so far as to hold that where the question could have
been raised in the answer, it is too late, after all the evidence is in,
for defendant to amend his answer so as to raise the constitutional
question. Many cases decide that it is too late to raise the point in
a motion for a new trial, except where there has been no previous
opportunity.8 Saxton National Bank v. Bennett9 seems to conflict
somewhat with this principle. In this case the constitutionality of
two statutes was raised for the first time in an amended motion for
a new trial. It did not appear whether there had been an earlier op-
portunity to raise the question. The court however did not discuss the
point, but held that it had jurisdiction. Altho the court seemed to
ignore the point as to when the constitutional question might be raised
during the trial, it must be assumed, as no contrary facts appear, that
it could not have been raised earlier than in the amended motion for
a new trial. But later cases, as Indicated by those cited, remove all
doubt on this point by holding that the constitutional question must
be raised at the earliest possible moment during trial.
A few cases hold that in raising the constitutional question a
specific reference to the provision of the Constitution violated is
not necessary.1o State v. Smithll goes so far as to decide that even
Hutchinson & Co. v. Morris Bros. (1905) 190 Mo. 673, 89 S. W. 820;
Shell v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1906) 202 Mo. 339, 100 S. W. 617; Municipal
Securities Corp. v. Kansas City (Mo. 1916) 186 S. WV. 989; Riley Penn., Oil
Co. v. Synonds (Mo. App. 1916) 190 S. W. 1038.
3. C ihj of Tarkio v. Clark (1904) 186 Mo. 285, 85 S. W. 329.
4. Ellis Investment Co. v. Jones (Mo., 1916) 187 S. W. 716.
5. Brookline Canning & Packing Co. v. Evans (1911) 238 Mo. 599, 142
S. W. 319; Botts v. Wabash By. Co. (1913) 248 Mo. 56, 154 S. W. 53.
6. Lohomeyer v. Cordage Co. (1908) 214 Mo. 685, 113 S. W. 1108.
7. (1911) 238 Mo. 184, 142 S. W. 338.
8. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Ridge (1902) 169 Mo. 376, 68 S. W.
1043; Lohmneyer v. Cordage Co. (1909) 214 Mo. 685, 113 S. W. 1083;
Hartzler v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1908) 218 Mo. 562, 117 S. W. 1124;
George v. Quincy By. Co. (1913) 249 Mo. 197, 155 S. W. 453; Wh4tsett
et al. v. City of Carthage (Mo., 1915) 184 S. W. 1185.
9. (1897) 138 Mo. 494, 40 S. W. 97.
10. State v. St. Louis Court of Appeals (1888) 97 Mo. 276, 10 S. W. 874.
Seo Baldwin v. Fries (1890) 103 Mo. 286. 15 S. W. 760.
11. (1897) 141 Mo. 1, 41 S. W. 906.
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tho the appellant makes no reference during the trial to the violation
of any constitutional right, yet, if a constitutional question Is necessarily
involved in the decision of the case, the Supreme Court will take
jurisdiction. The court admits the general rule to be that the protec-
tion of the Constitution must be expressly invoked but distinguishes the
case on the ground that it was submitted to the trial court on an
agreed statement of facts. The prevailing view, however, is that in In-
voking the protection of the Constitution, the exact provision alleged
to be violated must be stated. A general reference is not sufficient.12
Shaw v. Goldman 13 decides that even tho the substance of the constitu-
tional provision alleged to be violated is stated in the objection, that
is not sufficient. Tho this seems to be the weight of authority else-
where,14 such a requirement seems nevertheless to be unduly technical.
The court gives as a reason against allowing a general objection to
the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, that such an objection
makes it "possible to contend in the trial court it offended against one
provision of the Constitution, while in the appellate court it might be
claimed it violated a totally different provision of the Constitution, and
in this way the trial court might be adjudged guilty of error in respect
to a matter that was never called to its attention and upon which
it never ruled." But it Is obvious that this reason does not exist when
the substance of the constitutional provision alleged to be violated is
set forth. The appellate court could under such circumstances as
easily determine whether the appellant relies on the same constitutional
provision in both the trial and the appellate court as when he In
the lower court gives in his objection the exact section and article. In
fact an objection that a certain statute deprived the appellant of his
property without due process of law is more definite than for him
to say that by reason of said statute his rights under Sec. 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States are
Infringed, because this section secures many rights other than those
involving security of property. But under the weight of authority an
objection that the appellant Is being deprived of his property without
due process of law does not raise a constitutional question. There are,
however, a few cases which hold that it is sufficient to set forth
in the objection the substance of the constitutional provision alleged
to be violated.15
12. Ash v. City of Independence (1902) 169 Mo. 77, 68 S. W. 888;
Stato v. Smith (1903) 176 Mo. 44, 75 S. W. 468; St. Joseph v. Life
Insurance Co. (1904) 183 Mo. 1, 81 S. W. 1080; Excelsior Springs v.
Ettenson (1904) 188 Mo. 129, 86 S. W. 255; State v. Kuehner (1907) 207
Mo. 605, 106 S. W. 60; Lohmeyer v. Cordage Co. (1908) 214 Mo. 685, 113
S. W. 1108.
13. (1904) 183 Mo. 461. 81 S. W. 1223.
14. Anderson v. State (1907) 2 Ga. App. 1, 58 S. U. 401, and cases cited
therein; Rose v. State (1908) 171 Ind. 662, 87 N. E. 103; 3 Corpus Juris
712.
15. State ex rel v. St. Louis Court of Appeals (1888)97 Mo. 276, 10
S. W. 874; Adkins v. City of Richmond (1900) 34 *S. E. 967.
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Where the decision of the constitutional question is not essential
to the disposition of the appeal, there Is some confusion in the cases
as to whether the supreme court will take jurisdiction, The rule
supported by the weight of authority is that jurisdiction will be taken
even tho the appeal can be disposed of on other grounds.10 This
is a sound doctrine in view of the principle that supreme courts will
not decide constitutional questions presented in the record if the
appeal can be disposed of on other grounds.17 If the Supreme Court
should say it will not take jurisdiction unless a ruling on the constitu-
tional question is essential to the disposition of the case, it would In
effect be saying to the court of appeals that the other points in the
case should be decided in appellant's favor. However LAMM, J., in a
strong dictum in Ranney v. Cape Girardeau,8 states that "in order
to bring an appeal within our jurisdiction on a constitutional ground
It must appear that a constitutional question is essential to the deter-
mination of the case." A line of cases is cited as sustaining this princi-
ple, but they decide only that to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court, It must appear that the determination of a constitutional question
was essential to the disposition of the case by the trial court.19
There are certain constitutional rights which cannot be expressly
waived. A defendant Indicted for a felony cannot agree to be tried
by a jury of less than twelve, which right is guaranteed to him under
Art. II, Sec. 22 of the Missouri Constitution.20 If the general doctrine
laid down in the Missouri cases that a party waives his constitutional
right by failing to object at the earliest opportunity to its violation
applies to all cases, it becomes an interesting question as to what be-
comes of the doctrine that certain constitutional rights cannot be waived
by ,agreement. There seems to be no case involving an alleged waiver
of such a constitutional right because of a failure to object at the proper
time.
In Donoho v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., supra, the plaintiff sued because of
an injury to his race horse while in transit over defendant's railroad.
The defendant pleaded that it was not liable because the plaintiff
had not fulfilled the terms of the shipping contract and objected to a
certain instruction granted by the court claiming that it impaired the
obligation of the shipping contract in violation of Section 15, Article
2 of the Constitution of Missouri, and also in violation of the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. This case
16. Dorrance v. Dorrance (1912) 242 Mo. 625, 148 S. W. 94; Skinner v.
St. Louis Ry. Co. (1914) 254 Mo. 228, 162 S. W. 327; Stanley v. St. Louis
By. Co. (1914) 254 Mo. 237, 162 S W. 240.
17. Ex parte Randolph (1833) 2 Brock 447; Elliott v. Oliver (Ore.,
1892) 29 Pac. 1.; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations p. 163.
18. (1914) 255 Mo. 514, 164 -S. W. 582.
19. State ex rel. v. Sinth (1897) 141 Mo. 1, 41 S. W. 906; Kirkwood
v. Meramac Highlands Co. (1900) 160 Mo. 111, 60 S. W. 1072 ; State ex rel.
v. Snmith (1903) 176 Mo. 44, 75 S. W. 468; City of Tarkio v. Boyd (1903) 179
Mo. 600, 78 S. W. 797.
20. State v. Mansfield (1867) 41 Mo. 471.
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was transferred from the Kansas City Court of Appeals to the Missouri
Supreme Court on the ground that a constitutional question was
involved. The Supreme Court properly ruled that if a constitutional
question existed, it was properly presented, but that none existed
because an erroneous construction of a contract does not impair the
obligation of the contract or deprive the defendant of his property with-
out due process of law as guaranteed by the Missouri and Federal
Constitutions. As pointed out in the opinion, the Supreme Court will
not assume for jurisdictional reasons that the court of appeals will
misconstrue a contract. Any contrary assumption would amount to
saying that the court of appeals either does not know the law or
that it would decide contrary to the law. So the case was properly re-
manded to the court of appeals.
GARDNER SMITH
EVIDENCE--ADMISSION OF PAROL EVIDENCE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF
WILLs-AMBIGUITIEs-DECLARATIONS 'OF THE TESTATOR. MUd4 v. Cun-
ningham.1-George Cunningham in his will purported to devise to
his daughter Mary "the south half of the south half of the northeast
quarter of section 26." However, it appeared that the testator did not
own, and had never claimed, the land above described. In another para-
graph of the will he gave the southwest fourth of the northeast quarter
of section 26, which he did own, to four other children. The south half
of the south half of the northwest quarter had been owned by the testa-
tor and was not disposed of by the will. Mary Cunningham had con-
veyed this land in the northwest quarter to the plaintiff, Mudd, who
brought this action to determine title. The defendants, children of
the testator, claimed an Interest in the land upon the ground that as
to it their father had died intestate. Evidence was admitted that the
scrivener in drawing up the will had by mistake written northeast in-
stead of "northwest" before the words "quarter of section 26" in the de-
vise to Mary, but the trial court rejected evidence offered by the plaintiff
of declarations made by the testator as to lands intended to be conveyed
by the will. However, upon the other evidence the plaintiff was ad-
judged to be owner of the land involved. This judgment the Supreme
Court affirmed2 upon the ground that the misdescription of the land
in the will was a latent ambiguity and the Missouri rule "permits the
use of extrinsic evidence to explain the said latent ambiguity after it
had been made to appear."
The pole star of construction of wills is the intention of the testa-
tor,3 and a statute4 in Missouri requires courts to have due regard to the
1. (1915) 181 S. W. 386.
2. BOND, J., dissented but gave no opinion.
3. Hall v. Stephens (1877) 65 Mo. 577; Niehols v. Boswell (1890) 103
Mo. 151, 15 S. W. 343; Meiners v. Meiners (1903) 179 Mo. 614, 78 S. W.795. 4. Revised Statutes 1909, § 583. This act is declaratory, merely, of the
common law. Yocu-, v. Siler (1900) 160 Mo. 281, 61 S. W. 268; Gannon
v. Park (1906) 200 Mo. 75, 98 S. W. 471.
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true Intent of the testator in all matters. This Intention is not sub-
ject to technical rules of construction5 and when found will be enforced
if not inconsistent with some rule of law.6 Testamentary dispositions
of property are, however, required to be in writing, and formally exe-
cuted and attested7 and the testator's intention must be found in the
will Itself or these requirements will be defeated.8
To be effectuated, then, the intention of the testator must appear
in the formal instrument. But in interpreting a will courts are not
limited to a consideration of words alone. "It was a part of the stiff
formalism of earlier interpretation, not only that the law should fix
the meaning of words and phrases but also that all aids to the mean-
ing must be found in the document itself."o However, courts have
been reluctantly forced to realize that words can never be absolute and
fixed in meaning,1O but are necessarily relative to the person using them,
the circumstances by which he Is surrounded, and the persons or
objects to which they are applied. Thus "the true Intent and meaning
of the testator can be best ascertained by the courts. . . . putting
themselves, as far as may be, in the place of the testator and reading
all his directions therein contained in the light of his environment
at the time it was made.""' But this Is not a negation of the require-
ment that the Intention of the testator must be found in the will. In
Nichols v. Boswell12 it is pointed out that extrinsic evidence cannot be
"resorted to to ascertain the intention of the testator; to do so would
be to defeat the requirement that all wills shall be in writing." The court
here voices the distinction between admitting parol evidence to show
the testator's intention and to show the meaning of the intention he has
expressed in his will,1S and while the Missouri decisions do not gener-
ally use the word "meaning" and often use "intention" in Its place,
they recognize a distinction between the testator's Intention generally
and the meaning of that intention as expressed in the will.14 The ad-
mission of evidence of extrinsic circumstances in aid of interpretation
is necessary in order to give the court seeking the meaning of the
written words the standard of the individual maker, and it is well
5. Kendrick v. Cole (1876) 61 Mo. 572 ; Burnet v. Burnet (1912) 244
Mo. 491, 148 S. W. 872; State ex rel. Gordon v. McVeigh (1914) 181 Mo.
App. 566. 164 S. W. 673.
0. Small v. Field (1890) 102 Mo. 104, 14 S. W. 815; O'Day v. O'Day
(1905) 193 Mo. 62, 91 S. W. 921.
7. Revised Statutes 1909, § 537.
8. Hall v. Stephens (1877) 65 Mo. 677; Nichols v. Boswell (1890) 103
Mo. 151, 15 S. W. 343; Meiners v. Meiners (1903) 179 Mo. 614, 78 S. W. 795.
9. Wigmore, Evidence § 2470.
10. For the history of this principle, see Wigmore, Evidence § 2462.
11. Murphy v. Carlin (1892) 113 Mo. 112, 117, 20 S. W. 786.
12. (1890) 103 Mo. 151, 157, 15 S. W. 343.
13. See Wigmore, Evidence § 2459.
14. See Gregory v. Co-wgill (1854) 19 Mo. 415; Meraman v. Mersinan
(1896) 136 Mo. 244, 37 S. W. 909; Hurst v. Von de Veld (1900) 158
Me. 239, 58 S. W. 1056; Willard v. Darrah (1902) 168 Mo. 660, 68 S. W.
1023; Missouri Baptist Sanitariumt of St. Louis v. Mcune (1905) 112 Mo.
App. 332, 87 S. V. 93; Griffith v. Witten (1913) 252 Mo. 641, 161 S. W. 708.
14 LAW SERIES, MISSOURI BULLETIN
settled in this state that some parol evidence is, in general, admissible
when the problem before the court is the construction of a will.15
To what extent such evidence is admissible is not clear from the
Missouri decisions. In language the courts have adhered to the rules
that "extrinsic evidence cannot be given to add to or vary the terms of
the written instrument"'6 and that "the plain meaning of the will
cannot be disturbed."17 The first is based upon the requirement that
the intention of the testator must be incorporated in a formal instru-
ment, and the validity of this reason cannot be questioned. Courts,
as pointed out in Mudd v. Cunningham,1s have no power to reform a
will, no matter how clear it may appear that a mistake has been made.19
Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show an Intent which the testa-
tor has not in some manner embodied in his will.20 But it is also a
rule in this state that in construing a will in the light of surrounding
circumstances, terms may be omitted, changed, or even added to ef-
fectuate the intention of the testator.21 Thus the result prohibited by
the rule against varying the terms of the will is reached in the process
of interpretation, and it would seem that the rule against varying the
terms of the instrument survives only in those oases in which the testa-
tor's real intention cannot be effectuated by construction, as where there
is nothing in the will into which the real intention can be read or
where the language used In the will shows that the testator was not
himself certain of his Intention.
The rule against disturbing a plain meaning Is based upon the
theory that the words used by a given testator are fixed and absolute
in meaning. This rule often appears in the Missouri decisions but
has in fact little force today. When the courts adopted the principle
15. 'See Clotilde v. Lutz (1900) 157 Mo. 439, 57 S. W. 1018; Tebow
v. Dougherty (1907) 205 Mo. 315, 103 'S. W. 985. In Gregory V. Cowgill
(1854) 19 Mo. 415; McQueen v. Lilley (1895) 131 Mo., 9, 17, 31 S. W. 1043;
Roberts v. Crume (1902) 173 Mo. 572, 579, 73 S. W. 662; Missouri Baptist
Sanitarium of St. Louis v. MeCune (1905) 112 Mo. App. 332, 338, 87 S. W. 93,
the rule is stated negatively,-that is such evidence must not be looked to
unless the terms are not clear or an amibiguity has arisen from its clear
terms. These dicta are clearly erroneous as it is impossible to declare the
meaning of any provision, no matter how clear in statement and unamblgu-
ous in fact without a knowledge of facts dehors the instrument. Incon-
sistent statements of the rules naturally result from the refusal of the
courts to recognize the "parol evidence rule' as a principle of the substantive
law of wills and not a rule of evidence. See Wigmore, Evidence § 2400.
16. Hall v. Stephens (1877) 65 Mo. 670; Small v. Field (1890) 102
Mo. 104, 14 S. W. 1815; Krechter v. Grofe (1901) 166 Mo. 385, 66 S. W. 358;
Brown v. Tuschoff (1911) 235 Mo. 499, 138 S. W. 497.
17. Bradley v. Bradley (1857) 24 Mo. 311; Drake v. Crane (1894) 127
Mo. 85, 29 S. W. 990; Missouri Baptist Sanitarium of St. Louis v. McCune
(1905) 112 Mo. App. 332, 87 S. W. 93.
18. (1915) 181 S. W. 386.
19. Goode v. Goode (1856) 22 Mo. 518; Mudd v. Cunningham (1915)
181 S. W. 386. But see Thomson v. Thomson (1892) 115 Mo. 56, 21 S. W.
1085.
20. Lehnhoff v. Theine (1904) 184 Mo. 386, 83 S. W. 469. See also
Asten v. Asten, (1894) 3 Ch. 260.
21. Prosser v. Hardest* (1890) 101 Mo. 593, 14 S. W. 628; Thomson
v. Thomson (1892) 115 Mo. 56, 21 S. W. 1085; Briant v. Garirison (1899)
150 Mo. 655, 52 S. W. 361; Mudd v. Cunningham (1915) 181 S. W. 386.
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of construing a will in the light of surrounding circumstances, they
accepted the standard of the particular testator in interpreting the
terms used by him, and recognized that the "plain meaning" of words
differs with different writers.2 2 The Missouri courts have, however,
refused to apply this principle where the terms of the will are definite
and capable of being enforced and no ambiguity arises upon their
application.23 But with the exceptions noted, it seems that the rules
against varying the terms of the will, and against disturbing the
plain meaning do not in fact operate against the admission of parol
evidence in this state, but are in effect avoided and exist only in the
dicta and loose language of the decisions.
When the court In the principal case states that an established
Missouri rule permits the explanation of latent ambiguities by extrinsic
evidence, It but echoes the classical distinction between latent and
patent ambiguities,24 which has been repeatedly voiced by the courts
of this state. According to this classification,25 a patent ambiguity
is an inconsistency or a doubtful expression in the language of the will,
and a latent ambiguity an uncertainty as to the testator's meaning
arising in the attempted application of apparently clear and definite
terms of the wi11.26 Evidence of extrinsic circumstances is rejected in
the former case and admitted in the latter upon the following theory:
that since the Intention must be found in the will, if the ambiguity Is
patent, the evidence would show an intention different from that ex-
pressed, and hence, the inconsistent provisions must fail for uncertainty
unless they can be explained by an interpretation of the will itself.
But if the ambiguity is latent, the intention disclosed by extrinsic
evidence only shows which of a number of apparent meanings, all
consistent with the terms of the will, is the true one. As a latent
ambiguity cannot be found except by looking at circumstances
dehors the will, the distinction between parol evidence to show and
parol evidence to explain the latent ambiguity must be recognized.27
Where there is a latent ambiguity the uncertainties as to the testa-
tor's meaning are of two kinds; either the terms are applicable
equally, or substantially so,25 to two or more persons or objects, or the
property or person has been so mistakenly described that according to
22. See Wigmore, Evidence § 2461.
23. See Mersman v. Mersman (1896) 136 Mo. 244, 37 S. WT. 909.
24. See 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 946.
25. Jennings v. Brizeadine (1869) 44 Mo. 332. In the early case of
Davis v. Davis (1843) 8 Mo. 56, the court does not distinguish betweein
patent and latent ambiguities but says "some patent ambiguities allow a
resort to extrinsic evidence and others do not." In Riggs v. Myers (1855) 20
Mo. 239, the distinction between an inaccuracy and an ambiguity in language
is made clear.
26. Mudd v. Dillon (1901) 166 Mo. 110, 120, 65 S. V. 973; Robards
v. Brown (1901) 167 Mo. 447, 67 S. W. 245; McMahan v. Hubbard (1908)
217 Mo. 624, 118 S. W. 481.
27. See Willard v. Darrah (1902) 168 Mo. 660, 68 S. W. 1023.
28. This seems to be the rule in Missouri. Willard v. Darrah (1902)
168 Mo. 660, 68 S. W. 1023. But see Hardy v. Matthews (1866) 38 Mo.
124.
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the exact terms of the will there is no property given or no person to
take. The first of these is an equivocation, the second a misdescription.
Where description has both the elements of equivocation and misde-
scription, i. e., where as to each of two persons or objects29 it is parti-
ally correct and partially incorrect, the case is generally regarded as one
of misdescription.3o But in Willard v. Darrah3l the testator had devised
land to his "well beloved nephews John and William Willard," and
two sets of brothers by these names claimed the land under this pro-
vision, viz., grandsons who had been intimate with the testator, and
grandnephews whom the testator scarcely knew. Saying "the des-
cription of the person is partly correct and partly incorrect, leaving
something equivocal," the court regards as an equivocation what
is generally said to be a misdescription, and on principle, the view of
the court seems the proper one as the description applies substantially to
two or more persons. In the language of a few of the Missouri cases
the distinction between an equivocation and a misdescription is no-
ticed,82 but usually the cases are disposed of as was the principal case,
by merely calling the uncertainty a latent ambiguity.3 And as the
basis of this distinction between the forms of latent ambiguity is the
admission in one case, and the rejection in the other, of declarations
made by the testator, and in Missouri, as will be pointed out, this evi-
dence Is admissible upon proof, of a latent ambiguity-regardless
whether such ambiguity is equivocation or mlsdescription, the courts
have not, except by way of a few dicta, preserved the useless distinc-
tion between the kinds of latent ambiguity.
In the construction of wills in which there are latent ambiguities,
the principle of the maxim falsa demonstratio non nocet34 is often
followed by the Missouri courts, and where the extrinsic evidence shows
that a mistake has been made in describing the beneficiary or the prop-
erty intended, the excessive or false part of the description Is rejected
In the Interpretation, and enough remaining to identify the object
29. The Missouri cases have not recognized the unsound distinction
sometimes made between persons and objects. See Bradley v. Bradley
(1857) 24 Mo. 311. See also Thomson v. Thonson (1892) 115 Mo. 56, 21
S. W. 1085.
30. See Wigmore, Evidence § 2474.
31. (1902) 168 Mo. 660, 68 S. W. 1023.
32. Riggs v. Myers (1855) 20 Mo. 239; McMahan v. Hubbard (1908)
217 Mo. 624, 118 S. W. 481.
33. No case of equivocation in the construction of a will has been
found excepting Willard v. Darrah, (1902) 168 Mo. 660, 68 S. W. 1023, as
above explained. Equivocations in deeds are latent ambiguities. Hardy
v. Matthews (1866) 38 Mo. 124; Goff v. Roberts (1880) 72 Mo. 570. The
contra decision in Mudd v. Dillon (1901) 166 Mo. 110, 65 S. W. 973, is clearly
erroneous.
Misdescriptions in wills are latent ambigulties. Hockensmnth v. Slusher
(1858) 26 Mo. 237; Thomson v. Thomson (1892) 115 Mo. 56, 21 S. W. 1085;
McMahan v. Hubbard (1908) 217 Mo. 624, 118 S. W. 481; Mu-phy v. Cloacy
(1913) 177 Mo. App. 428, 163 S. W. 915. But the rule seems otherwise in
the case of deeds. Hardy v. Matthews ( '866) 38 Mo. 124; Jennings v.
Brizeadine (1869) 44 Mo. 332; King v. Finl (1873) 51 Mo. 209.
34. See Wigiore, Evidence §, 2476.
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or party meant by the testator, this meantng will be effectuated.35
Thus in Thompson v. Thompson,36 where there was a devise of "land
upon which I now reside," followed by a particular description erroneous
in part, the court rejected the false part upon the principle of the maxim.
This decision was approved and the maxim again followed in Board
of Trustees of Methodist Episcopal Church, South v. May,37 where
the testatrix devised her "Kansas City property on Olive Street,
numbers 705 and 1489," and these numbers were rejected as excessive
when it appeared that the only property in Kansas City owned by
the testatrix was numbers 1705 and 1914 Olive Street. The maxim
is as applicable to persons as to objects,38 and from the Missouri
decisions it appears that the courts have applied the maxim in a very
liberal manner.8s The result reached in the principal case, viz., that
the testator intended to devise the land in the northwest quarter
instead of that described as in the corresponding part of the northeast
quarter, might well have been based upon a rejection of the word
"east," the false part of the description in the devise to Mary; then
the remaining part, "the south half of the south half of the north
. quarter of section 26", would have indicated the land in
the northwest quarter owned by the testator and not otherwise devised
in the will instead of the corresponding land in the northeast quarter,
half of which he did not own and the other half of which he had devised
to the other children in the third paragraph of the will.
While a number of the cases admit the evidence of extrinsic cir-
cumstances upon the ground that there is a latent ambiguity, the more
favored authority is Mr. Wigram's fifth proposition relating io the
admission of parol evidence in the interpretation of wills:40 "For
the purpose of determining the object of a testator's bounty, or the sub-
ject of disposition, or the quantity of interest intended to be given
under the will, a court may inquire into every material fact
as to the circumstances of the testator . . . for the purpose of
35. See Riggs v. Myers (1855) 20 Mo. 239.
36. (1892) 115 Mo. 56, 21 S. W. 1085. GANJTT, S., dissented upon the
ground that a definite, tho erroneous, particular description must control over a
sufficient general description. See Rutherford v. Tracy (1871) 48 Mo. 325
Calloway v. Henderson (1895) 130 Mo. 77, 32 S. W. 34.
37. (1906) 201 Mo. 360, 368, 99 S. W. 1093.
" 38. Skinker v. Haagsma (1889) 99 Mo. 208, 12 'S. W. 659. See Thomson
v. Thomson (1892) 115 Mo. 56, 21 S. W. 1085; Gordon v. Burris (1897)
141 Mo. 602, 43 S. W. 642; Willard v. Darrah (1902) 168 Mo. 660, 68 S. W.
1023.
39. McMahan v. Hubbard (1908) 217 Mo. 624, 118 S. W. 481. The
mistake in the description was similar to the error in the will in Mudd v.
Cunningham and the land intended was identifled by the rejection of the false
part. As the erroneous description was the only allusion to the land in the
will it appears that the narrow doctrine of Kurtz v. Hibner (1870) 55 Ill.
514, is not law in Missouri, and " my land" or the equivalent of these
words is not necessary as an identification of the land erroneously described.
In King v. Fink (1873) 51 Mo. 209, the court refused to apply the maxim
in construing a deed which contained an error similar to that in the will in
McMahan v. Hubbard.
40. Quoted from Wigram, Treatise on Extrinsic Evidence in Aid of
the Interpretation of 'Wills, in Thayer, Cases on Evidence, 2d ed., p. 917.
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enabling the court to identify the person or thing intended by the testa-
tor, or to determine the quantity of interest he has given by his will.
The same (it is conceived) is true of every other disputed point re-
specting which it can be shown that a knowledge of extrinsic facts can,
in any way, be made ancillary to the right interpretation of the
testator's words."41 In Small v. Field42 and McMahan v. Hubbard,43
this doctrine is said to be well settled Law in this state. However,
most of the decisions which apply this rule are cases in which the terms
of the will are clear on their fact but uncertainty is produced by extrin-
sic evidence, and by dicta the cases embraced within the proposition
are impliedly classed as latent ambiguities.44 But the language of the
doctrine quoted is equally as applicable to cases in which the doubt
as to the testator's meaning is created by obscure or inconsistent lan-
guage in the will, and it appears that extrinsic evidence is admissible
to explain such indefinite language,4 5 tho no case has been found
which expressly holds that a patent ambiguity may be resolved by
evidence dehors the instrument. Hence, in admitting extrinsic evi-
dence it seems to be immaterial whether the ambiguity is patent or
latent. But even under this doctrine extrinsic evidence of intention
could not be given where the will itself shows the testator was not him-
self certain as to his intention, because to do so would be to make a new
will for the testator and violate the requirement that the intention must
be found in the will.46 But, since words may be changed, omitted,
or even added in interpreting a will which contains on Its face obscure
or Inconsistent provisions,47 it is submitted that the classical distinc-
tion between patent and latent ambiguities has in effect been aban-
doned,48 and, with the one exception, as a matter of fact no longer
controls the admission of parol evidence in this state.
But there is one kind of extrinsic evidence which is suspiciously
regarded by courts generally, viz., parol declarations by the testator
regarding the disposition of his property by the will. The ob-
jection to this direct evidence of intention, as it is often called, is this:
that the testator is required by law to declare his intention in a formal
41. Riggs v. Myers (1855) 20 Mo. 239; Creasy V. Alverson (1868) 43
Mo. 13; Small v. Field (1890) 102 Mo. 104, 14 S. W. 1815; Willard v.
Darrah (1902) 168 Mo. 660, 68 S. W. 1023; McMahan V. Hubbard (1908)
217 Mo. 624, 118 S. W. 481.
42. (1890) 102 Mo. 104.
43. (1908) 217 Mo. 624, 118 -S. WT. 481.
44. MeMahan v. Hubbard (1908) 217 Mo. 624, 118 S. W. 481; Mudd
V. Cunningham (1915) 181 S. W. 386,
45. Nichols v. Boswell (1890) 108 Mo. 151, 15 S. W. 343; Garth v.
Garth (1897) 139 Mo. 456, 41 S. W. 238; RothuwelZ v. Jamison (1898) 147
Mo. 601, 49 S. W. 503; Roberts v. Orume (1902) 173 Mo. 572, 73 S. W. 662;
Missouri Baptist Association of St. Louis v. Mcune (1905) 112 Mo. App.
332, 87 S. W. 93.
46. Asten v. Asten (1894) 3 Ch. 260.
47. Thomson v. Thomson (1892) 115 Mo. 56, 21 S. W. 1085; Briant v.
Garrison (1899) 150 Mo. 655, 52 S. W. 361.
48. In Thomson v. Thomson (1892) 115 Mo. 56, 21 S. W. 1085, counsel
for appellant submitted this question in his brief but it was not passed upon
by the court.
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will, and to give effect to any of his declarations not made in this
will would be an evasion of this requirement.49 Thus oral declarations
cannot be given to show an intention not referred to in any way in
the will,50 or where the will Itself shows that the testator was not him-
self certain as to, his intention.5 1 But where this rule52 is not involved,
the reason for the prohibition is gone, and declarations of the testator
are not only highly convenient, but often necessary to the court seek-
ing the meaning of the testator's words.53 Some of the Missouri cases
seem to distinguish between the oral declarations of the testator and
evidence of the testator's feelings toward persons affected by his
will,14 and the courts are apparently drawing the line between evidence
of extrinsic circumstances generally and direct evidence of intention.
In other cases, however, no distinction is made between declarations and
other evidence of intention dehors the will.5
In England, declarations are admissible only in cases of strict
equivocation.56 Or rather it should be stated that where the declara-
tions are admitted there is an equivocation, and where rejected a mis-
description, as the basis of this classification of latent ambiguities seems
to be the admissibility of this direct evidence of intention, tho there
is no valid reason for this distinction.57 No rule can be stated for
the United States generally as the question has been seldom raised,
and in Missouri declarations of intention made by the testator have
been admitted in evidence in cases of misdescription without reference
to any distinction between the kinds of latent ambigulty.58 And while
It is often stated that declarations of intention are admissible when there
is a latent ambiguity,59 the language of the Missouri decisions does
not limit the admission of such evidence to such cases but extends the
principle to any case of doubtful meaning, even where the uncertainty
is patent.60 This strengthens the conclusion that, as a matter of fact,
the distinction between patent and latent ambiguities is no longer
of any Importance in this state.
In the principal case the uncertainty as to the testator's meaning
was created by a misdescription which the court calls a latent ambigu-
49. Davis v. Davis (1843) 8 Mo. 56; Lehnhoff v. Theine (1904) 184 Mo.
386, 83 S. W. 469.
50. Lehnhoff v. Theine (1904) 184 Mo. 386, 83 S. W. 469.
51. Asten v. Asten (1894) 3 Ch. 260.
52. See Wigrmore, Evidence §. 2425.
53. Hurst v. Von de Veld (1900) 158 Mo. 239.
54. McQueen v. Lilley (1895) 131 Mo. 9, 31 S. W. 1043; Snyder v. Taler
(1914) 179 Mo. App. 381, 166 "S. W. 1059.
55. Gregory v. Cowgill (1854) 19 Mo. 415; Bradley v. Bradley (1857)
24 Mo. 311.
56. Doe d. Hiscocks v. Hi8oocks (1839) 15 M. & W. 363.
57. See Wigmore, Evidence § 2474.
58. Gordon v. Burris (1897) 141 Mo. 602, 43 S. W. 642.
59. Thomson v. Thomson (1892) 115 Mo. 56, 31 S. W. 1085, Judge Gantt
dissenting. But see Davis v. Davis (1843) 8 Mo. 56; Lehnhoff v. Theine(1904) 184 Mo. 386, 83 S. W. 469.
60. Mersman v. Mersman (1896) 136 Mo. 244, 37 S. W. 909 ; Hurst v.
Von de Veld (1900) 158 Mo. 239, 58 S. W. 1056; Webb v. Hayden (1901) 166
Mo. 39, 65 S. W. 760.
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ity explainable by extrinsic evidence, but the declarations of the
testator were rejected, If in this state declarations of the testator are
merely a part of the extrinsic circumstances, if all latent ambiguities
may be resolved by this direct evidence, and, finally, if misdescriptions
may be explained by parol statements made by the testator, it would
seem that the court should have admitted in evidence the declarations
of George Cunningham that he intended Mary to take the land so
mistakenly described.
While there is much confusion and conflicting authority in the
Missouri cases involving the admission of parol evidence in the con-
struction of wills, the chief source of uncertainty lies in the loose,
general language of the courts. It seems that, regardless of the
confusing language with which they are clothed, uniform tendencies
exist, and that there are definite principles which are applied by the
courts in fact in the guise of old rules and apparently upon the basis
of distinctions no longer really in force. It is believed that the
Missouri courts have developed and generally recognize the following
principles: extrinsic evidence, including declarations of the testator,
is always admissible to ascertain the meaning of the terms of the will,
except where its provisions show either that the testator has not Incor-
porated his intention in the will, or that a definite and clear provision
capable of being carried out as expressed is not the testator's real in-
tention. Or stated in terms of the law of wills rather than as a rule
of evidence, the real intention of the testator will be effectuated If
possible by reading it into the terms of the will by liberal construction,
except that the provisions of the instrument will not in substance be
added to or omitted.
L. C. LoziEn
EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST DEFAMATION. Wolf v. Harris.-
A reputable physician sought to restrain an insolvent defendant from
continuing to publish libelous matter charging the plaintiff with mal-
practice. The Supreme Court held that an injunction could not be
granted. This result, following the decisions in Life Ass'n of America
v. Boogher,2 Consumer's Gas Co. of Kansas City v. Kansas City Gas-
light and Coke Co.,5 and Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co.,4
seems justifiable under our Bill of Rights5 which declares "that no law
shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech;6 that every person
1. (1916) 184 S. W. 1139.
2. (1876) 3 Mo. App. 173.
3. (1890) 100 Mo. 501, 13 S. W. 874.
4. (1892) 110 Mo. 492, 19 S. W. 804.
5. Constitution, Article II, § 14.
6. This does not prohibit the imposition of liability after publication
in certain cases, even tho It interferes in a measure with the freedom of
speech. It is constitutional (1) to punish by statute the publication of
immoral and indecent matter. State v. Wye (1896) 136 Mo. 227, 37 S. W. 938.(2) To punish scandal about the courts. State v. Shepherd (1903) 177 Mo.
205, 76 S. W. 79. (3) And to punish matter dangerous to the conduct of
military operations in time of war. Ex parte Vallandlngharn (1863) 1
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shall be free to say, write or publish whatever he will on any subject,
being responsible for all abuse of that liberty; and that in all suits
and prosecutions for libel the truth thereof may be given in evidence,
and the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the
law and the fact."
But this general rule that equitable relief will not be given
against defamation seems to be modified in Missouri to this extent:
an injunction will be allowed where the writIng or publication is part ef
a wrong which would be enjoined of itself. Thus in Hamilton Brom
Shoe Co., v. Saxey7 the court enjoined the defendant from interfering
with plaintiff's employees by threats, personal violence, intimidation
or other means calculated to terrorize or alarm them.8 It seems that
a growing number of decisions allow injunctions in these cases.0
The constitutional requirement of a trial of questions of defama-
tion by a jury presents the greatest obstacle to jurisdiction in equity.
The Missouri courts, for instance, cannot direct a verdict for the plain-
tiff In these cases.le It would be unduly narrow to attack the
probably sound policy of allowing jury trials in these cases by arguing
that the jury was only required In criminal cases or civil cases for
damages, and not in proceedings In equity. But when the publication
is admitted, and most cases do arise on demurrer, why should a jury
be required? Why could not the court grant an Injunction just -as it
does in certain cases of trespass,"' disturbances of easements12 or
nuisances.13 Professor Pound4 after pointing out the effort made In
the early English cases to allow an injunction, shows that the practice
first arose of allowing an injunction in cases where the libel was re-
peated or the publication continued after a jury had found the matter
Wall (U. S.) 243. (4) Our Constitution probably does not guarantee the
liberty to intimidate by speech or writing, but'the decisions are not very
consistent. In State v. McCabe, (1896) 136 Mo. 450, 37 S. W. 123, a
statute was upheld which made It a misdemeanor to compel a debtor to
pay a just debt by threatening to publish his name as a bad debtor-even tho
it were true. In Marx, etc., Co. v. Watson, (1902) 168 Mo. 133, 67 S. W. 391,
a similar injury to credit was involved altho perhaps not so directly, and
an injunction was refused. Assuming that the latter court would have
followed the first case if this had been a prosecution under the statute, whyl
would it not grant an injunction-the Injury appearing to be an irreparable
one? Even the an act is a misdemeanor equity may enjoin its commission
if the remedy at law is inadequate for altho the fact that a particular act
Is a crime or misdemeanor is no basis for relief in equity, it is also no basis
for denying relief.
7. (1895) 131 Mo. 212, 32 S. W. 1109.
8. Cf. Lohse, etc., Co. v. Fuelle (1908) 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997.
9. Spinning Hed Co. v. Riley (1868) L. R. 6. Eq. 651; Seattle
Brewing and Malting Co. v. Hansen (1905) 144 Fed. 1011 (notices incidental
to a boycott) ; Coeur D'Alene Co. v. Miners Union (1892) 51 Fed. 260, 19 L.
R. A. 382; Sherrmj v. Perkins (1888) 147 Mass. 212,; Jordahl v. Haykde
(1905) 1 Cal. App. 696, 82 Pac. 1079; Emack v. Kane (1888) 34 Fed. 46.
10. Heller v. Pulitzer Pub. Co. (1899) 153 Mo 205, 54, S. W. 457.
11. Miller v. Lynch (1892) 149 Pa. St. 460, 24 Atl. 80; Hart v. Leonard
(1886) 42 N. J. Eq. 416, 7 Atil. 865.
12. Selby v. Nettleford (1872) 9 Ch. App. 111; Newell v. Lass (1892)
142 II. 104.
13. Hayden v. Tucker (1866) 37 Mo. 215; Carpenter v. Greshan (1875)
59 Mo. 247; Turner v. Stewart (1883) 78 Mo. 480.
14. 24 H. L. R. 665.
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libelous.15 Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co.,16 has a dictum to
the same effect. Later It came to be held that if the libel was clearly
established, an injunction would be granted without plaintiff going to a
court of law. - He says further that the Common Law Procedure Act
(1873) affords very slight foundation for this result, and that the
courts strained a point to grant equitable relief. Today the English
courts will grant an interlocutory injunction against a libel if it is
clearly shown to be one,18 exactly as in the case of any other tort. The
American cases have not gone so far, and have only enjoined the publica-
tion as incidental to an unlawful boycott or unlawful intimidation of
employees.
Probably in Missouri the modern English rule will only be reached
by legislation. If the dictum in Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co.,
be adopted, and an injunction granted after verdict, it will afford more
adequate relief, but when the facts are admitted and the case is re-
duced to a matter of pleadings, why should not one's business or reputa-
tion be protected from an insolvent, malicious defamer without the
delay of a jury trial?
J. P. HANNIGAN
RAPE ON INSANE WOMAN-DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF INSANITY.
State v. Helderle.1-The defendant was tried and convicted for
rape. The woman was eighteen years of age and of unsound mind at
the time. It was shown that she had given her actual consent and that
defendant did not know of her mental condition, nor had he knowledge
of any facts from which his knowledge of her insanity could be in-
ferred. Upon this state of facts the Supreme Court held defendant's
lack of knowledge a defense, three judges dissenting. FAsS, J., for
the majority based his opinion on the authority of previous Missouri
decisions2 and on the theory that a conviction under such circumstances
would destroy the presumption of innocence and establish instead a
presumption of guilt merely upon proof of the woman's insanity.
WOODSON, C. J., in a concurring opinion held that as defendant had no
felonious Intent he was not guilty. REVELLE, J., dissenting, contended
that, owing to the woman's insanity there was no consent sufficient in
law to prevent the act from being rape.
15. Saxby v. Easterbrook (1878) 3 C. P. D. 339; Halsey v. Brotherhood(1880) 15 Ch. D. 514, 19 Ch. D. 386.
16. (1892) 110 Mo. 492, 19 S. W. 804.
17. Liverpool Ass'n v. Smith (1887) 37 Ch. D. 170; Bonnard v. Perrry-
man (1891) 2 Ch. 269.
18. Collard v. Marshall (1892) 1 Ch. 571. For the present practice, 'see
James v. James (1872) 13 Eq. 421; Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam
(1880) 14 Ch. D. 763; Thomas v. Williams (1880) 14 Ch. D. 864; Herman
Loog v. Bean (1884) 26 Ch. D. 306; Hayward v. Hayward (1886) 34 Ch.
D. 198; Walter v. Ashton (1902) 2 Ch. 282.
1. (1916) 186 S. W. 696.
2. State v. Cunningha4 (1889) 100 Mo. 382, 12 S. W. 376; State v.
Warren (1910) 232 Mo. 185, 134 S. W. 376; State v. Schlichter (1913)
263 Mo. 274, 173 S. W. 1072.
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The crime of rape is defined in the statute,3 so far as it affects the
case under consideration, as the forcible ravishment of any woman of
the age of 14 or upward. Absence of consent is a necessary element of
the crime under this part of the statutory definition.,4 Under certain
conditions unlawful sexual intercourse may be rape even tho the
woman consents to the act. This is true in cases where she is deemed
incapable, either in law or in fact, of giving a valid consent. If she
is below the statutory age her consent Is immaterial.5 If she is under
the influence of drugs6 or intoxicants7 she may be incapacitated in
fact. An insane woman Is deemed by the law incapable of consenting
and for that reason intercourse with her may be rape If the defendant
knew of her insanity, even if no force is used and she does not resist.8
In the case of rape upon a woman under the age of consent a
bona fide and reasonable belief that the girl was above such age is
no defense.9 In such cases, however, this result seems to be required
by the terms of the statute and the question presented by State v.
Helderle is whether a similar doctrine can be applied as a matter of
common law in cases where defendant has intercourse with an-insane
woman not knowing of her insanity. The result of the Missouri
decisions on the question, as above cited, is that if defendant had at
the time of intercourse no knowledge and no means of knowledge of
the insanity he cannot be convicted of rape if the woman appears to
consent. Authorities are not numerous but In People v. Grilfnio which
was an indictment under a California statute in which rape was defined
as illicit sexual intercourse with a female of unsound mind, thus differ-
ing materially from the Missouri statute, a conviction was sustained.
The court held that the defendant acted at his peril and his ignorance
was no defense. This conclusion seems to have been required by the
terms of the statute.
The principal argument against a conviction In those cases in
which defendant had no knowledge of the Insanity is that he labored
under a reasonable mistake, and had not therefore the necessary
men8 rea to make him guilty of a crime."1 However it is not necessary
in Missouri that a specific intent to violate the law or to do a particular
act must invariably be present in order that a crime can be committed.
The man who shoots at A with intent to kill him and accidently kills
3. Revised Statutes 1909, .§ 4471.
4. State v. Cunningham, supra, State v. Murphy (1893) 118 Mo. 7, 25
S. W. 95.
5. State v. Day (1905) 188 Mo. 359, 87 S. W. 465.
6. Harlan v. People (1904) 32 Colo. 397; State v. Green (1860) 2
Ohio Dec. (Rep't.) 255.
7. State v. Hairston (1897) 121 N. C. 579; Territory v. Edie (1892) 6
N. M. 555; Regina v. Camp oin (1845) 1 Cox C. C. 220.
8. State v. Cunningham (1889) 100 Mo. 382, 12 S. W. 376; State v.
William~s (1899) 149 Mo. 496, 51 S. W. 88.
9. State v. Houx (1891) 109 Mo. 661, 19 S. W. 35; State v. Basket,(1892) 111 Mo. 272, 19 S. W. 1097; State v. Johnson (1893) 115 Mo.
480, 22 S. W. 463.
10. (Cal., 1897) 49 Pac. 711.
11. State v. Schlichter (1913) 263 Mo. 274, 173 S. W. 1072.
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B is guilty of the murder of B.12 One who brandishes a weapon in
public, with no intent to injure, and in doing so kills another is guilty
of manslaughter because he had the intent to do a dangerous act.3
In the application of this doctrine should a difference be made be-
tween cases where the facts show an intent to commit an indictable
act and where the intent is to do an act not indictable yet recognized
as morally wrong or detrimental to society? If the act to the ac-
complishment of which the defendant's intention is Immediately di-
rected is morally wrong and anti-social, regardless of its prohibition
by law, there is at least a dictum In Missouri to the effect that he takes
his chances of the criminality of consequences he did not contemplate.14
A single act of fornication or of illicit sexual Intercourse between
unmarried persons is not indictable in Missouri. It is however uni-
versally recognized as an act highly immoral in its very nature and
against the best Interests of society. The defendant here intended
the commission of this immoral act and it is submitted that tho he was
ignorant of the woman's insanity he acted at his peril and if in the
course of the commission of such an act he actually has intercourse
with a woman or because of her insanity is not capable of giving an
adequate consent, his Ignorance of her mental condition should be
no defense.
Altho it is doubtless possible to draw a distinction between the cases
involving questions of the age of consent and Insanity cases, inasmuch
as the former cases seem to depend upon the terms of the statute, it
will be noticed that the courts not infrequently base their conclusion
that knowledge of the woman's age is immaterial on reasoning which
could be readily applied in such cases as State v. Helderle. Such
convictions are almost invariably justified on the ground that defendant
had the intent to do an act which was wrong in its very nature tho he
had no intent to do an act which was indictable. The same process
of reasoning might well lead to a conclusion different from that reached
by the majority of the court in State v. Helderle.
PAUL G. KOONTZ
CONTRACTS-WHEN IS A LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT CoMPLETE?
Tainter v Central States Life Jnswrance 0o.-The plaintiff's
husband made an application for life insurance to the defend-
ant's soliciting agent and gave him as payment for the first prem-
ium his note due in six months. The applicant was subsequently
examined by the defendant's local physician who forwarded his re-
port to the home office. A day later the applicant was killed. The
defendant learning of this, refused to issue a policy and wired its
12. State v. Montgomery (1886) 91 Mo. 52, 3 S. W. 379.
13. State v. Emery (1883) 78 Mo. 77.
14. State v. Houx (1891) 109 Mo. 654, 661, 19 S. W. 35.
1. (Mo., 1916) 185 S. W. 1185.
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agent to return the note. Two months later the plaintiff made a demand
for a policy, and upon defendant's refusal to issue one asked for the
note. This was also refused, the secretary stating that it was in the
agent's possession. After about eight months the plaintiff tendered the
agent the amount due on the note but he refused to accept it, and
failed to offer to return the note. Afterwards an action was brought.
The company procured the note and offered it in court for cancellation.
A judgment for the defendant was affirmed by the Kansas City Court
of Appeals.
An application for life insurance is to be regarded only as an offer.2
To complete the contract an acceptance by the insurer is necessary, and
as there are always certain express or implied conditions performance
of these by the insured is also necessary before the contract is deemed
operative. The usual conditions are the issuance of a policy, the deliv-
ery to the insured and the acceptance thereof by him and payment of
the first premium, while in good health. The validity of such condi-
tions precedent to the formation of the contract has been sustained by
the courts.3 Since these conditions are for the benefit of the insurer
he may waive them. When the waiver arises by implication courts
have often called it an estoppel, and in the cases we find the two
used interchangeably.4
In the principal case there was no acceptance in fact of the
application, and the theory upon which the action was brought, as
viewed by the appellate court, was that the insurance company had
impliedly waived the requirements necessary to an acceptance, viz.,
the approval of the application and the issuance of a policy.
The giving of the note as payment for the first premium before the
application had been forwarded to, and acted upon by, the insurer, in
no way bound the company as this is the customary proceeding. The
giving of the note was subject to the agreement, implied if not express,
that it was to be returned if the company did not accept the offer
made in the application.
Counsel for the plaintiff sought to bring the principal case within
the decision in Rhodus v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co.5 The appli-
cation in that case contained the provision that the contract was not to
b deemed operative until the policy had been delivered to, and accepted
by, the applicant while in good health. Previous to the issuance of a
policy the applicant died, but after his death the defendant's agent
collected the sum due on a note given by the deceased at the time
the application was made. After deducting his commission the agent
forwarded the balance to the defendant who, after gaining knowledge
2. McCracken v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (Ore., 1916) 156 Pac. 640.
3. Kohen v. Mutual Reserve Fund Ins. Co. (1888) 28 Fed. 705;
Cravens v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1898) 148 Mo. 583, 50 S. W. 519.
4. Central Life Ins. Co. v. Roberts (Ky., 1916) 176 S. W. 1139, citing
Kiern v. Dutchess County Mutual Ins. Co., (1896) G0 N. Y. 190, and Globe
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wolff, (1877) 95 U. S. 326.
5. (1911) 156 Mo. App. 281, 137 S. W. 907.4
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of all the facts, failed to tender a return of the money even after
suit was filed. The court of appeals held that the retention of the
premium was a waiver of the conditions in the application. The
language of the opinion indicates that the defendant became liable by
virtue of its ratification of the agent's act in collecting the note with
knowledge of the applicant's death. The court says that the defendant
"adopted the agent's! acts as consummating a contract without a
formal approval of the application on the issuance of a policy."
As regards the power of a soliciting agent of life insurance
to waive conditions, or consummate contracts, the authorities are
not uniform. The better rule seems to be that he is without such
power.6 Two recent cases have taken opposite views.7 The Supreme
Court of the United States has inclined to the one limiting the agent's
authority.8 The Missouri courts take the position that such an agent
may not waive conditions. In Bell v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co.,9
the agent delivered the policy with knowledge that the applicant was
not in good health. The premium was sent to the defendant who learned
f -September that the condition had been violated. The offer to return
the premium was not made until the following January. In affirming
the judgment for the amount of the policy in the plaintiff's favor the
court conceded the fact that the agent had not the power to waive the
condition, and based its decision on the ground of a ratification of the
agent's act by the defendant, evinced by its failure to tender return
of the premium for a period of four months.
In an earlier case, Norman v. United Commercial Travellers,o
the failure of the insurer to refund the premium was termed "con-
clusive evidence" of an acceptance where that failure had continued
after he had gained knowledge of all the facts. But in that case
the premium had been sent to the defendant's home office, and there
retained. Two years after this decision the Springfield Court of
Appeals in Porter v. Loyal Americans"l did not deem the failure of
the agent to return the premium "conclusive evidence" of an acceptance
by the company where the company had expressly directed a return
and where it at all times denied liability to the plaintiff.
If the agent in the principal case had no authority to complete the
contract by retaining the premium note the company became liable,
if at all, either by virtue of a ratification of his act, or because it is
6. See Richards, Insurance Law (3d ed.) p. 198.
7. The agent with authority to solicit, accept premiums, and deliver
policies has authority to waive condition of delivery to insured while in
good health. McClelland v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1916) 217 N. Y. 316, 111 N.
E. 1062. Contra, American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Thomaa (Ore., 1916) 154 Pac.
44.
8. Northern Assurance Co. v. Grandview Bldg. Ass'n. (1901) 183 U.
S. 308.
9. (1912) 166 Mo. App. 390, 149 S. W. 33.
10. (1912) 163 Mo. App. 175, 145 S. W. 853.
11. (1914) 180 Mo. App. 538, 167 S. W. 578.
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estopped from denying the existence of a contract thru his failure to
tender return of the note.
The defendant did nothing which may be construed as an adoption
of the agent's act. It did not adopt by retention as the note never came
into its possession. Its express direction to the agent, also, negatives
the idea of adoption.
The defendant does not seem to be estopped as it expressly took the
position that no contract existed. The plaintiff had knowledge of this
attitude at the outset. As stated in Porter v. Loyal Americans, at p.
546, "no one was lulled or lured into nonaction by the defendant's con-
duct." The plaintiff -cannot be heard to say that she relied on the
agent's failure to return the premium as leading her to believe the
contract was In existence because the principal had previously ex-
pressly repudiated any contractual relation. Assuming even that
the agent's knowledge of the non return of the premium was imputable
to the defendant the situation as between it and the plaintiff remains
unchanged. The defendant still denies the existence of a contract altho
it knows that the agent, contrary to his orders, has failed to refund the
premium. The defendant remains liable for the premium because it
was received by its agent In an authorized capacity, but as the defend-
ant has unequivocally Informed the plaintiff that no contract has
arisen the plaintiff may not rely on the agent's conduct, and urge that
the defendant is estopped.12
The Missouri courts, it is submitted, have taken a desirable course
in restricting the doctrine of implied waiver, or so-called estoppel,
to cases in which the defendant's own conduct has been clear as to the
recognition of a contract of insurance. From this point of view the
principal case has been properly distinguished from Rhodus v. Kansas
City Life Ins. Co."3
S. H. LIBERMAN
AsSAULT AND BATTERY-DEFENSE OF A THIRD PERSON-RIGHT OF A
PARENT TO DEFEND A CHILD. State v. MeNail.1-Two boys, A and B,
engaged in a fight. A was the son of the defendant. C, the brother of
B, a boy fifteen years old, interfered and attempted to hold A so that B
could beat him. When the defendant saw the added peril in which his
son was placed, he interfered and pushed C away and struck at him,
for which interference defendant was convicted of assault and battery.
There was substantial evidence that defendant used no more force
than was reasonably necessary to protect his son. The court below
declined to instruct the jury as to the right of the defendant to
protect his son. The St. Louis Court of Appeals, In reversing the case,
held that the "defendant had the same right to act in defense of his
12. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rudolph (1876) 45 Tex. 454.
13. (1911) 156 Mo. App. 281, 137 S. W. 907.
1. (1916) 182 S. W. 1081.
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son in the circumstances of the case that the son engaged in the affray
had to act in defense of himself."
The question involved in this case is as to the existence of a
right in the father to act in defense of his son. State v. Fo0ey2 lays
down the rule flatly, that "whatever one may do for himself he may do
for another." This statement does not accurately represent the law
of Missouri for it fails to distinguish between the right of one to defend
another standing in a family relation and the right to defend a stranger.
Neither does it attempt to set apart those cases in which the inter-
ference of the third party is for the purpose of defending the one as-
sailed from an apparent battery not involving a felonious attempt, from
those cases in which the intervention of the third person is to prevent
the commission of a felony, or to protect the assailed from what reason-
ably appears to be a felonious attack.
A stranger may intervene to preserve the peace where there is
nothing but a simple assault and battery but he cannot actively de-
fend either the assailant or the one assaled.3 In cases where there
is reasonable apprehension that a felony is about to be committed he
may justify an intervention on the grounds that he did it in "lawfully
keeping and preserving the peace." 4 Altho the right of the stranger
to intervene is based on the same reason in each case, yet In the latter
case, because of the serious nature of the attack, the law generally
permits him to enter 'actively in the lawful defense of the one attacked
in the same right that the one attacked has to defend himself and to the
same extent. Substantially, then, a stranger in such cases has the same
right to defend another that the other has to defend himself,S while
in cases of assault and battery not involving a felonious attempt,
he may intervene only to preserve the peace. There is some authority
to the effect that a stranger in defending against a felonious attack
must proceed with greater caution than one standing in a mutual
family relation,O but the cases in Missouri do not seem to have followed
this distinction.
One may defend husband,7 wife,8 parent,9 child,1o master, or ser-
vant,"1 with the same right that the other would have to defend
2. (1882) 12 Mo. App. 431.
3. Comnonwealth v. Cooley (1856) 72 Mass. 350; Spicer v. People
(1882) 11 Ill. App. 294; Morrison v. Comnonwealth (1903) 24 Ky. Law
Rep. 2493, 74 S, W. 277; Wharton, Crirm Law, 8 825; Kelley, Crim. Law and
Practice, § 585; 3 Blackstone, Commentaries *3.
4. Revised Statutes 1909, §, 4451.
5. State v. Foley (1882) 12 Mo. App. 431; State v. Totiman (1899) 80
Mo. App. 125; Brouster v. Fox (1906) 117 Mo. App. 711, 93 S. W. 318.
6. State v. Harper (1899) 149 Mo. 514, 51 S. W. 89; Conner v. State(1833) 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 137; Kelley, Criminal Law and Practice, . 523.
7. Cokely V. State (1857) 4 Iowa 477.
8. State v. Bullock (1889) 91 N. C. 614.
9. State v. Linney (1873) 52 Mo. 40; Commnonwealth v. Malone
(1873) 114 Mass. 295; State v. Herdtna (1878) 25 Minn. 161; Smith v.
State (1911) 61 Tex. Crim. App. 349; Cox v. State (1911) 99 Ark. 90.
10. State v. Harper (1899) 149 Mo. 514, 51 S. W. 89; State v. Hickam
(1888) 95 Mo. 322, 8 -S. W. 252; State v. Johnson (1876) 75 N. C. 174.
11. Orton v. State (1853) 4 Greene (Iowa) 140.
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himself regardless of whether the assault is felonious or not. The
reasons given are that one owes a duty to defend those standing in such
relations; that one has the same interest in defending them as he has
in defending himself and that the basis of the active protection and
defense of such is just as instinctive as in the case of self-preservation.
The right of one to defend another standing in a mutual relation Is
generally held to be no greater than the right that other has to defend
himself12 In State v. Meltonl3 the court held that an instruction to the
effect that the defendant had no greater right to defend his brother than
his brother had to defend himself was correct. In this case the evidence
indicated that the defendant knew his brother was the aggressor. State
v. Harper" holds that a son is justified in killing his father's ag-
gressor if there is reasonable apprehension of an apparent felony,
regardless of whether the father was the aggressor or had entered the
fight voluntarily, provided that the father did not enter the affray
with a felonious intent, and, further, that the son did not know who
began the assault. State v. Harper may be distinguished from State v.
Melton in that, in the latter case, there was substantial evidence that
the defendant knew of his brother's fault; and that brothers do not
stand In the category of mutual relations according to the common
law. State v. Harper is difficult to justify and is opposed to the over-
whelming weight of authority in other jurisdictions.
In State v. Harper the defendant interfered to prevent a felony or
the infliction of serious bodily injury upon his father, and in State
v. Hickam,15 which was an indictment for assault with intent to
kill, it was held that the defendant, coming upon the scene without
knowing who was the aggressor, had the right to defend his mother,
sister and servant against what was probably no more than a simple
assault and battery. The defendant in State v. McNail interfered to
protect his son from an impending battery. It appears from the facts
stated that the prosecuting witness was the aggressor, and that the doc-
trine of State v. Hickam is not involved. The case is sound and is
thoroughly in accord with previous decisions in Missouri and the great
weight of authority elsewhere.
RoscoE E. HARPER
PERPETUTITIES-EFFECT OF REMOTENESS. Riley v. Jaeger.1-
A testator devised all of his property to his eight children "intending
each to have a full and equal share," and providing for a deduction
12. State v. Brittain (1889) 89 N. C. 481; State v. Herdina (1878)
25 Minn. 161; Crowder v. State (1881) 8 Lea (Tenn.) 669. See State v.
Melton (1890) ,02 Mo. 683, 15 S. W. 139; Waddell v. State (1877) 1
Tex Crim. App. 720.
13. 102 Mo. 683, 15 -S. W. 139.
14. (1899) 149 Mo. 514, 51 S. W. 89. Accord, State v. Linney(1873) 52 Mo. 40; State v. Hickam (1888) 95 Mo. 322, 8 S. W. 252. See
State v. Turner (1914) 246 Mo. 598, 152 S. W. 313.
15. (1888) 95 Mo. 322, 8 S. W. 252.
1. (1916) 189 -S. W. 1168.
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of advancements. He stipulated that real estate which had been ad-
vanced to four of the children should be held by them for life, without
power of alienation, with remainder as to the share of each to his
descendant. He further declared "that in event of the death of any of
my said eight children without issue, or in case the direct descendants of
any one of such children aforesaid shall all die, that in either such case
the share of such child shall revert to the survivor of the eight
direct legatees named and to the descendants of such as may be
deceased-said shares when so reverting to be held by the several recip-
ients subject to the above restriction and limitations, it being my
desire that all my property remain with my children or their descend-
ants and in no event become the property of strangers to my blood."
He then provided that all advancements which had been made, or which
should be made, should be held by his children "free from all debts
contracted or to be contracted by them or either of them; In order the
more fully to secure the same to them and their descendants."-
In an action to quiet title, the circuit court held this will to be void
because of the rule against perpetuities. The Supreme Court in affirm-
ing this judgment relies upon Lockridge v. Mace2 and Shepperd v.
Fisher.3 The opinion is confined to a discussion of the remoteness of
the attempted gift. No effort was made to avoid the application of the
rule against perpetuities by a strained construction of the will. The
decision therefore confirms the established rule that the construction
of any limitation must be made wholly independently of the rule against
remoteness.4
The court showed no disposition to inquire into the extent of the
Invalidity which was occasioned by a remoteness of a part of the
testator's scheme of disposition. In Lockridge v. Mace a devise to
the testator's wife for life, remainder to his children for life, remainder
to his grandchildren for life, remainder to his great-grandchildren
in fee, was held void because it was thought to constitute
"but one disposition of the 'home farm,'" and the property
passed as intestate property. In Shepperd v. Fisher, there was
a devise to the testator's daughter Mary for life "and at her death to
her bodily heirs, if the said bodily heirs have bodily Issue, forever,
but should the said bodily heirs of the said Mary die without issue"
then to the testator's heirs; this devise was held to "constitute but one
general disposition of all the lands and tenements of which the testator
died seized," and the whole was therefore held to be void. The question
at once arises whether the devise In Riley v. Jaeger can be said to have
constituted but one disposition of the testator's property, so as to
2. (1891) 109 Mo. 162, 18 S. W. 1145.
S. (1907) 206 Mo. 208, 103 S. W. 989.
4. 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 14; Gray, Perpetuities, (3d
ed.) .q 629; Dime Savings & Trust 0o. v. Watson (1912) 254 Ill. 419. ] ut
if two constructions are equally permissible, that should be preferred
which avoids remoteness. Allen v. Almy (1913) 87 Conn. 517.
NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES
necessitate the failure of the devise in toto because of the remoteness of
the gift over on the death of the children's descendants.
The writer has insisted that the rule of Lockridge v. Mace and
Shepperd v. Fisher, invalidating as it does limitations of a testator's
property which have in them no intrinsic taint, should be very nar-
rowly limited.5 These decisions go further than decisions in other
states, where the tendency is to uphold as many of the limitations of
a will as are not in themselves remote, unless it very clearly appears
that the testator would have desired all of his gift to fail if part of It
could not take effect. Thus Lockridge v. Mace has been spoken of as
being "somewhat out of line with the other courts,"6 and Professor
Gray in commenting on the case said,7 "It is confidently to be hoped
that the learned court of Missouri will come into line with other courts."
Even if the rule of Lockridge v. Mace and Shepperd v. Fisher has become
a settled rule of the law of property so that under the doctrine of
stare dectsis It can not now be overthrown, still it is submitted that it
Is a rule which ought not to be extended, and for the application of
which careful analysis should be made of every will containing re-
mote limitations. If this position Is sound, it Is to be regretted that
the Supreme Court in Riley v. Jaeger did not take the trouble to state
that the remote limitations were so bound up with the other limitations
that the testator had attempted a general scheme of disposition to which
the peculiar Missouri rule as to the effect of remoteness would necessa-
rily apply. BLAIR, J., in his opinion, merely stated that "this devise is
clearly violative of the rule against perpetuities," and proceeded to affirm
the holding of the court below that the will was void. One is led to ask
whether in the future the existence of one void remote limitation In
a will is going to be held to be sufficient to invalidate the whole will.
Surely our law should not be developed toward such a position. Yet,
if as in Riley v. Jaeger, wills are declared wholly void because of the
application of the rule against perpetulties to some of the limitations,
it will not be long until such an extreme position will be contended
for.
The question then remains whether in Riley v. Jaeger the void
limitations were so connected with other limitations as to constitute
"a general plan of disposition" within the meaning of that expression
as used in Shepperd v. Fisher. The testator gave his property out-
right to his eight children, and since there was nothing to limit their
interests to life estates, they clearly took a fee simple. The ultimate
remote limitation was made in substitution for the estate thus con-
ferred on the testator's children, and it would have operated, if at all,
by way of executory devise. In Van Pretres v. Cole,s there was a similar
5. See the writer's 'article on "The Rule Against Perpetuities in
Missouri" 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, pp. 22-28.
6. 20 L. R. A. 509.
7. Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) §249a.
8. (1880) 73 Mo. 39.
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devise of a fee simple, with an executory devise over to a residuary
legatee who was incapable of taking under the law of mortmain; the
court held that the first devisee took the whole estate free from the void
executory devise over. It is difficult to see why a devisee should not con-
tinue to hold even tho the executory devise be void for remoteness,
inasmuch as the first devisee in such cases as Van Pretres v. Cole
continues to hold in spite of the invalidity of the executory devise on
account of the incapacity of the devisee. The situation is not one
where the court should resort to a weighing of the various elements
of the testator's intention, for the purpose of conjecturing whether
he would have desired any of his intention to be validated if all can
not be validated. But on the facts in Riley v. Jaeger, it is quite clear
that the testator desired his property to go to his children, and there
is nothing to indicate that he would have desired all of his devise to
fail if he had been informed that the gift over on the children's de-
scendants' death without children was void.
The devise in Riley v. Jaeger also contained void restrictions on
alienation. Would it be contended that because of the invalidity of these
provisions of restraint, the devise itself Is void? It has always been
held that the Invalidity of a restraint on alienation simply frees the
devise of the restraint. It might have been held in Riley v. Jaeger that
the invalidity of the executory devise simply freed the estate given to
the children of the executory devise.
As an authority, this case is to be distinguished on the ground
that the result of the decision Is not wholly at variance with the
result which would have been reached if the court had held that the
rule of Lockridge v. Mace and Shepperd v. Fisher did not apply. As
the case was decided, the property passed as intestate property, and
all of the testator's eight children therefore shared in it. If the court
had refused to apply the rule of Lockridge v. Mace and Shepperd v.
Fisher, all of the property would have passed to the same children,
except that they would have taken by purchase instead of by descent
and their portions would have been subject to the testator's provisions
for the deduction of advancements. Furthermore as to certain ad-
vancements, certain of the children would have taken only life estates
with remainders to their descendants. Undoubtedly the court would
be influenced by the circumstances that the invalidity of the whole
will would result in conferring the property upon persons other than
those who are named in the will itself as devisees. Even if in such
a case as Riley v. Jaeger there Is a general plan of disposition which
must fail in toto as a result of the invalidity of a part, it may be ex-
pected that the court would hesitate to find such a general plan if as a
result the property would pass to persons in no wise named in the
will Itself.
It Is to be hoped that when the question again arises *the court
will show some disposition to limit the rule of Lockridge v. Mace
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and Shepperd v. Fisher; or failing that, at least that it will point
out that there is a basis for the application of such a rule. At present
it can not be safely assumed that any part of a will is valid, if any other
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